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ABSTRACT
The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger to transfer
a superior technology is derived in a di¤erentiated goods duopoly, for the cases of Cournot
and Bertrand competition. We show that whenever both royalties and …xed fees are feasible,
mergers should not be allowed, which …ts the prescription of the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. By contrast, when only one instrument is feasible, be it …xed fees or royalties,
the possibility of licensing cannot be used as a de…nitive argument against mergers.
KEYWORDS: Merger; Patent Licensing; Competition Policy.
21. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, companies all over the world seem to have an insatiable appetite for mergers,
with the goal of capturing complementarities, scale economies, integrating technologies and
production facilities and achieving cost e¢ciencies. This phenomenon demands a severe
control by antitrust authorities to prevent anticompetitive behaviors. For example, until
1997, Section 5 of the 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG), prescribed to forbid
mergers whenever the e¢ciency gains were less than their competitive risks or whenever
“equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the parties through other
means”. In April 1997, however, section 5 on e¢ciencies was extended to explicitly include
among those “other means” the possibility of licensing: “The Agency will consider only those
e¢ciencies...unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or
another means having comparable anticompetitive e¤ects. These are termed merger-speci…c
e¢ciencies...The agency will not deem e¢ciencies to be merger speci…c if they could be
preserved by practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as...licensing.”
It is well known the increasing importance played by licensing in the di¤usion of new tech-
nologies in the last few years. For example, Arora and Fosfuri (1998) document a widespread
incidence of licensing in the chemical industry. Anand and Khanna (1997) report that licens-
ing is also very common in biotechnology and …nd that licensing has increased in frequency
between 1990-1993 (the time period of their study). Finally, evidence of the importance of
licensing in computers, automotive, biopharmaceuticals, engineering and electronics is also
reported in di¤erent surveys.
The rationale behind the 1997 HMG prescription seems to rely on the idea that, while a
merger facilitates the di¤usion of technology at the cost of reducing market competition, a
licensing contract is an e¢cient instrument to transfer technology. However, as we show in the
paper, the optimal contract to transfer a superior technology to a rival …rm includes always
a positive royalty (very often accompanied by a …xed fee) that (i) increases the licensee’s
marginal cost above its true marginal cost, softening in that way market competition and (ii)
3under Bertrand competition, it works as a collusive device that allows the …rms to commit
themselves to higher prices. Therefore, the welfare comparison between a merger and a
licensing contract becomes ambiguous. The sign of the comparison depends on whether
social welfare is a¤ected more negatively by the lower level of competition induced by a
merger or by the distortion of the licensee’s marginal cost induced by a licensing contract.
The main goal of this paper is to determine which of the two e¤ects dominates.
We compare social welfare under both a merger and a licensing contract in a di¤erentiated
goods duopoly for the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition, in order to derive the
optimal competition policy, and check whether that policy …ts the prescription of the 1997
HMG. We show that, regardless of the type of competition, whenever both …xed fees and
royalties are feasible instruments to license the superior technology, a licensing contract is
welfare superior to a merger, which …ts the prescription of the 1997 HMG.
Nevertheless, when only one instrument, either …xed fees or royalties, can be used by
the patentee, the HMG is shown to be too restrictive because it could lead to forbid welfare
improving mergers. In particular, when only a …xed fee is included in the licensing contract,1
the HMG is too restrictive because, regardless of the type of competition, for close enough
substitute goods and large enough innovations, licensing by means of a …xed fee becomes
unpro…table for the patentee. In those cases, a merger becomes the only e¤ective instrument
to transfer the superior technology and, hence, it should be allowed whenever it is welfare
improving. On the other hand, if we consider the case where only royalties are feasible,2
the patentee sets a greater royalty, distorting even more the licensee’s output and thus
additionally reducing welfare. In those cases and regardless of the type of competition,
for large enough innovations a merger becomes welfare superior to licensing and socially
desirable and it should then be allowed.
After deriving the optimal merger policy, we extend the analysis to take into account
1The optimal contract to license a cost reducing innovation to a rival …rm includes always a royalty
(Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2000a)), provided that the licensee’s output is veri…able. Otherwise, royalties are
not feasible, which can explain in our context the use of …xed fee contracts.
2That situation could arise due, for example, to the existence of a high degree of riskiness associated to
the innovation, that precludes the use of …xed fees.
4that, under Bertrand competition, a licensing contract may reduce social welfare. As a
consequence, interesting new cases appear where, under the optimal competition policy, not
only mergers but also licensing should be forbidden.
Regarding the existing literature on mergers, Williamson (1968) already pointed out the
trade o¤ involved in a merger: on the one hand, it reduces competition but, on the other
hand, it may generate e¢ciency gains. Several papers have derived alternative ways of
evaluating this trade-o¤ (Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Levin (1990), Mac A¤ee and Williams
(1992)). On the other hand, the issue of merger pro…tability has been addressed, among
others, by Salant et al. (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
and Lommerud and Sorgard (1997).
With respect to the licensing literature, it has mainly focused on comparing the perfor-
mance of …xed fees and royalties as instruments to market cost-reducing innovations. Un-
der perfect information, Kamien and Tauman (1984,1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Muto
(1993) and Erutku and Richelle (2000) analyze the case of an external to the industry paten-
tee. On the other hand, Katz and Shapiro (1985), Wang (1998) and Faulí-Oller and Sandonís
(2000a) extend the analysis to the case of an internal patentee. Finally, including asymmetric
information problems, Gallini and Wright (1990), Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1991),
Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) and Hornsten (1998) show that both fees and royalties should
be included in the optimal licensing contract. Nevertheless and to the best of our knowledge,
there is no paper in literature that relates these two …elds by considering both a merger and
a licensing contract as two alternative instruments to transfer technology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives the optimal merger policy for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In section
4, the analysis is extended to take into account the possibility that a licensing contract
reduces social welfare. Finally, a section with the main conclusions closes the paper. All
formal proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
52. THE MODEL
We consider two …rms, denoted by i =1 ,2,e a c hp r o d u c i n gad i ¤ e r e n t i a t e dg o o d( g o o d s1
and 2 respectively). They face inverse demand functions given by:
pi =1¡ xi ¡ °xj;i;j=1 ;2;i6= j;
where ° 2 [0;1] represents the degree of product di¤erentiation. Following Singh and Vives
(1984), these demands come from the maximization problem of a representative consumer
with utility separable in money (m)g i v e nb y :
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1 ¡ °2;i;j=1 ;2;i6= j:
Firm 2 has constant unit production costs of c. Firm 1 is assumed to have a patented
process innovation that allows to produce good 1 at a lower marginal cost, that we set,
without loss of generality, to be zero. Two di¤erent mechanisms to transfer the patented
technology to …rm 2 are considered: a licensing contract and a merger. Both mechanisms
are assumed to reduce the marginal cost of producing good 2 to zero4.
Depending on the size of the innovation we will distinguish between drastic and non-
drastic innovations. We will call an innovation drastic when it allows the patentee to mo-
nopolize its market. In particular, this is the case if c>c M; where cM =
2¡°
2 :
3Direct demands are not de…ned for ° =1 : Therefore, under Bertrand competition, we will restrict the
analysis to the case in which the goods are not homogeneous, that is, ° 2 [0;1).
4Notice that this assumption implies that both instruments allow the perfect and complete transmission of
the innovation. In other words, we consider both instruments equivalent from a technological point of view,
ignoring problems of asymmetric information between licensor and licensee, as well as the possibility that a
merger can create synergies that could give a merger a technological advantage over licensing. Considering
licensing and mergers technologically equivalent, while making the analysis tractable, will not signi…cantly
a¤ect the qualitative results we obtain. Its main consequence will be that, when deriving the optimal
competition policy in this setting, we will never be too permissive with respect to mergers.
6Incorporating the fact that …rm 1’s marginal cost is assumed to be zero, let us de…ne the
social welfare function as:
W(x1;x 2)=u(x1;x 2) ¡ c2x2;
where c2 =0if …rm 1’s technology is transferred and c2 = c otherwise.
The timing of the game is the following:
In the …rst stage, the antitrust authority decides whether or not to allow a merger between
…rms 1 and 2. In the second stage, the …rms have the possibility to merge (if allowed in
the …rst stage) or to sign a licensing contract. Given this decision, market competition
takes place in the third stage, with the cost functions inherited from the second stage. We
will solve by backward induction, obtaining the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
proposed game.
We will consider three di¤erent licensing scenarios: (1) two-part tari¤ (f;r) contracts,
(2) royalty (r) contracts and (3) …xed fee (f) contracts, where f represents a ‡at lump-
sum license fee and r represents a per unit of output fee (royalty). Scenario 2 could arise
for example when riskiness associated to the innovation precludes the use of fees. Scenario
3, when royalties are not feasible due, for example, to lack of veri…ability of the licensee’s
output. Otherwise, scenario 1 arises. The licensing game is modelled as follows: …rst, the
patentee makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to …rm 2; second, this …rm accepts or rejects the
contract. We do not allow for negative fees because, otherwise, as argued by Katz and
Shapiro (1985), contracts would include the possibility for the patent holder to “bribe(s)
…rm 2 to exit the industry...and would likely be held to be illegal by antitrust authorities.”5
It should be noted that the licensee’s marginal cost whenever a royalty is included in the
licensing contract (scenarios 1 and 2) is given by r and thus, the patentee plays the role of
a leader, as he determines the reaction function of the licensee by deciding the royalty to
be included in the contract. On the other hand, under fee licensing (scenario 3) or under a
merger, …rm 2’s marginal cost becomes zero.
5Notice that we do allow for contracts including negative royalties. Nevertheless, for the case of substitute
goods, it is never optimal for the patentee to charge a negative royalty. This would be the case, however, for
complementary goods, that are not considered in this work.
7In the next section, we shall proceed to solve the game in order to derive the optimal
merger policy under the three possible licensing scenarios. For the two …rst scenarios we will
present together the analysis and the results for both Cournot and Bertrand competition, so
that we can easily compare both regimes.
83. THE OPTIMAL MERGER POLICY
At the third stage of the game, if the …rms have merged in the previous stage, the merged
entity will produce the monopoly outputs for the two goods. Otherwise, the …rms will
compete either in quantities (Cournot) or in prices (Bertrand), with the marginal costs
inherited from the second stage. If no licensing contract has been signed, the statu quo will
prevail. On the other hand, under a licensing contract and Cournot competition they solve
respectively:
Maxx1fp1(x1;x 2) x1 + rx2g;
Maxx2fp2(x1;x 2) x2 ¡ rx2g;









¡ r =0 :
Changing the strategic variable from quantity to price adds an important new e¤ect to
the market competition stage: when choosing price, …rm 1 considers not only its e¤ect on
own market pro…ts but also on …rm 2’s demand, that determines its royalty revenues. In
this case they solve respectively:
Maxp1fp1x1(p1;p 2)+rx2(p1;p 2)g;
Maxp2fp2x2(p1;p 2) ¡ rx2(p1;p 2)g;
















Comparing the …rst order conditions under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, we
can see that in the latter case, a new term appears in the …rst equation (the third term)
that provides …rm 1 with an additional incentive to behave less aggressively in the market
stage: by strategically setting a higher price it increases …rm 2’s demand and thus, its royalty
revenues. Observe that the new e¤ect is absent when …rms choose quantities because, in that
case, …rm 2’s demand is not a¤ected by the decision (on output) taken by …rm 1. That is,
the royalty not only determines …rm 2’s marginal cost but it also works as a collusive device.
This explains that, contrary to the Cournot case, even if the patentee sets r = c and f =0 ;
…rm 2 would strictly prefer signing that contract to the statu quo in order not to lose the
collusive e¤ect mentioned above. In fact, by using a continuity argument one may argue that
…rm 2 would be willing to accept contracts such that r>c . However, we will not consider
that possibility because it would not a¤ect any of the qualitative results and one could argue
that …rm 2 would not produce using the new technology and, therefore, no royalties would
be paid.
The expressions for the equilibrium outputs, prices, pro…ts and total incomes for both
types of competition can be found in the appendix.
We start the analysis by scenario 1, comparing two-part tari¤ licensing with a merger.
3.1. Merging vs. two-part tari¤ licensing
Observe that, if allowed by the antitrust agency, the …rms will always choose to merge. On
the other hand, as two-part tari¤ licensing is always pro…table for the patentee, if a merger
is not allowed, licensing will take place. Intuitively, consider the simple contract r = c,
f =0 . Under Cournot competition, the patentee would obtain the same market pro…ts as in
the statu quo but the royalty revenues would make him strictly better o¤. Under Bertrand
competition, the collusive e¤ect produced by the royalty would make licensing be even more
10pro…table. Therefore, in order to design the optimal merger policy we have just to compare
social welfare under a merger and two-part tari¤ licensing.
In order to do that, we have …rst to obtain the optimal two-part tari¤ licensing contract,
that is, the contract that maximizes the patentee’s total pro…ts. That contract solves:
maxr;ff¼1(r)+rx2(r)+fg
s:t: f · ¼2(r) ¡ ¦2(c);
r · c;
where xi(r) and ¼i(r) denote …rm i’s equilibrium output and pro…ts under a licensing contract
including a royalty r,a n d¦2(c) denotes …rm 2’s pro…ts in the statu quo when its marginal
cost is c.6Observe that the second constraint implies that f cannot be negative.
That program can be rewritten in a simpli…ed way. As the …rst constraint is always
binding, it can be substituted in the objective function. The maximization problem thus
becomes:
maxrf¼1(r)+rx2(r)+¼2(r) ¡ ¦2(c)g
s:t: r · c:
Solving this program directly results in the optimal contract. For the case of Cournot it is
given by:





f¤ = ¼2(r¤) ¡ ¼2(c);
and for Bertrand competition by:





f¤ = ¼2(r¤) ¡ ¦2(c):
It is important to notice that the optimal two-part tari¤ licensing contract includes a
positive royalty, that distorts the licensee’s marginal costs. The patentee uses the royalty
to soften ex-post market competition and the fee to extract the increase in industry pro…ts
generated by the use of the superior technology.
6Observe that under Cournot competition ¼2(c)=¦ 2(c), while this is not true under Bertrand competi-
tion, due to the collusive e¤ect.
11Next proposition derives the optimal merger policy for this scenario. Both a merger and
the optimal two part tari¤ contract are anticompetitive. Hence, the sign of the comparison
will depend on whether social welfare is a¤ected more negatively by the lower competition
induced by a merger or by the distortion of the licensee’s marginal cost induced by the
licensing contract. The following proposition o¤ers a clear-cut result: regardless of the type
of competition, two-part tari¤ licensing is always welfare superior to a merger.
Proposition 3.1. When two-part tari¤ licensing contracts are feasible, mergers should
never be allowed.
Observe that the optimal merger policy derived in the proposition …ts the prescription of
the U.S. merger guidelines: when e¢ciency gains are not merger speci…c and can also be also
achieved through licensing, mergers should be forbidden. That result arises in a context in
which both …xed fees and royalties are feasible. We will next proceed to derive the optimal
competition policy for scenarios 2 and 3 respectively, where only one instrument, either a
royalty or a …xed fee, is feasible.
3.2. Merging vs. royalty licensing
The main di¤erence between this scenario and the previous one is that, now, a royalty is
the only feasible instrument to license …rm 1’s patented technology and it has to be used
not only to soften ex-post competition but also to appropriate the surplus generated by the
superior technology. As a result, a greater royalty will be chosen by the patentee, leading to
a greater distortion of the licensee’s marginal cost, which opens the possibility that a merger
becomes welfare superior to licensing.
The optimal royalty contract solves:
maxrf¼1(r)+rx2(r)g
s:t: r · c:
Direct resolution of that program results in:
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12for Cournot and Bertrand competition respectively. It can be easily veri…ed that the
optimal royalties are positive and greater than the corresponding ones in scenario 1, where
both royalties and fees were feasible.
Next, we shall proceed to compare a merger and royalty licensing from a social point of
view in order to derive the optimal merger policy for this scenario.
Proposition 3.2. When only royalties are feasible, for large enough innovations (c>c ml
for Cournot and c>c ml0 for Bertrand), mergers should be allowed by the antitrust authority.
When only royalties are feasible for the patentee, the optimal royalty is greater than in
the case where both royalties and fees can be used, which negatively a¤ects social welfare.
This is why, for large enough innovations and regardless of the type of competition, a merger
becomes welfare superior to licensing and, therefore, it should be allowed by the antitrust
authorities. On the other hand, for small innovations the royalty imposed by the patentee is
constrained to be small and, hence, licensing remains welfare superior to a merger. In that
case, mergers should be forbidden. Note that the result holds regardless of the degree of
product di¤erentiation. However, it can be seen that as the goods become closer substitutes,
the threshold values cml and cml0 increase. The reason is that closer substitutive goods imply
more intense competition, which makes a merger relatively more anticompetitive than a
licensing contract, thus decreasing the region where mergers should be allowed.
Next, we shall proceed to derive the optimal merger policy in scenario 3, where a …xed
fee is the only feasible instrument to license the superior technology.
3.3. Merging vs. …xed fee licensing
Licensing by means of a …xed fee allows the transfer of the superior technology without
reducing competition. Therefore, …xed fee licensing is welfare superior to a merger. However,
for large enough innovations and close enough substitute goods, licensing by means of a fee
becomes unpro…table for the patentee (as shown by Katz and Shapiro (1985) for the case
of homogeneous goods, the e¢ciency gains can be more than compensated by the rent
dissipation e¤ect, which drives down duopoly pro…ts). In that case, a merger becomes the
13only e¤ective instrument to transfer the superior technology and, therefore, it should be
allowed whenever it increases social welfare relative to the statu quo, which tends to occur
precisely for large innovations. We will present the results for each type of competition in a
separate subsection. While the analysis of licensing pro…tability follows a similar pattern in
both cases, the analysis of the merger policy is much more complex for Bertrand competition
and it requires a detailed attention. Let us start by the case of Cournot competition.
3.3.1. Cournot competition
Next proposition characterizes the conditions under which …xed fee licensing is not pro…table
for the patentee.
Proposition 3.3. Under Cournot competition, if °>0:82 and c>c L, licensing by means
of a …xed fee becomes unpro…table for the patentee.
The key point to explain the result is that, given that the patentee always binds the
licensee’s participation constraint through the …xed fee, …xed fee licensing is pro…table only
if industry pro…ts increase as a consequence of the licensing contract. When the goods are
very di¤erentiated, competition is not intense and industry pro…ts increase regardless of the
size of the innovation. For the case of close substitutes however, the trade-o¤ between the
e¢ciency e¤ect and the rent dissipation e¤ect becomes relevant. For small innovations, the
latter e¤ect is small and it is dominated by the former, given that the improved e¢ciency is
applied over many units of output that would be produced by …rm 2 under the statu quo.
For large innovations however, …rst, the rent dissipation e¤ect of transferring the innovation
is much higher and, second, the improved e¢ciency is applied to fewer units of output that
would be produced by …rm 2 under the statu quo. As a result, industry pro…ts would
decrease, making …xed fee licensing unpro…table for the patentee.
Next proposition establishes the conditions under which a merger is welfare superior to
the statu quo.
Proposition 3.4. Under Cournot competition, a threshold value cms always exists such
that a merger is welfare improving if and only if c ¸ cms.
14The above proposition can be seen as the optimal merger policy when the e¢ciency gains
attained through a merger are merger speci…c. Taking into account that cms increases with
°, it provides a nice illustration of the trade-o¤ between competition and e¢ciency involved
in a merger. While the size of the anticompetitive e¤ect is inversely related to the degree
of product di¤erentiation °, the e¢ciency e¤ect is captured by c; the size of the innovation.
Therefore, the greater the anticompetitive e¤ect (the greater °) the greater the size of the
e¢ciency gain (the greater c) required for the merger to be welfare superior to the statu quo.
Next proposition combines Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 in order to derive the optimal merger
policy.
Proposition 3.5. Under Cournot competition, when only a …xed fee can be included in the
licensing contract, if ° · 0:82, a merger should never be allowed; if °>0:82, it should be
allowed if and only if c ¸ cL:
The result is driven by the fact that cL >c ms. In other words, in the region where …xed
fee licensing is not pro…table for the patentee, a merger is welfare improving and it should
then be allowed. A direct implication of the proposition is that under the optimal merger
policy, technology is always transferred.
Let us derive next the optimal merger policy for scenario 3 under Bertrand competition.
3.3.2. Bertrand competition
Next proposition characterizes the conditions under which …xed fee licensing is not pro…table
for the patentee.
Proposition 3.6. Under Bertrand competition, if °>0:61 and c>c L0, licensing by means
of a …xed fee becomes unpro…table for the patentee.
The intuition for the result is exactly the same as for the case of Cournot competition.
The only di¤erence is that, given that Bertrand is a more intense type of competition, we
reach the region where licensing is not pro…table for the patentee even for lower values of °
than for the Cournot case.
15Next proposition derives the conditions under which a merger is welfare superior to the
statu quo.
Proposition 3.7. Under Bertrand competition, three threshold values cms0
, cn and cms00
;
with cms0 · cn <c ms00 exist such that when ° · 0:69, a merger is welfare superior to the
statu quo if and only if c ¸ cms0
; when 0:69 <°· 0:71,i fe i t h e rcms0
· c · cn,o rc ¸ cms00
,
and when °>0:71 if and only if c ¸ cms00, where the values of cms;c ms0, cn and cms00 are
provided in the appendix.
O b s e r v et h a te x c e p tf o rt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ei n t e r v a l0:69 <°· 0:71; the intuition behind
the result is similar to the one obtained for Cournot competition. Namely, mergers should
be allowed for large enough innovations such that their e¢ciency e¤ect outweights their
anticompetitive e¤ect. In those cases, the design of the optimal merger policy simply consists
of …nding the corresponding unique cut-o¤ value. Notice that this cut-o¤ value is higher for
the case of Bertrand than for Cournot because competition is more intense in the former
(see Vives (1985)).
The previous simple intuition, however, does not work for the intermediate interval in
the above proposition. The striking point in that interval is that, as the size of the inno-
vation increases, the optimal merger policy decision switches from approving the merger to
forbidding it. This implies that more than one cut-o¤ value is required to completely de…ne
the optimal merger policy.
Figure 1 plots, for ° =0 :70, welfare under both a merger (Wm) and the statu quo (Wsq)
as a function of c: While welfare under a merger is constant in c; welfare under the statu
quo follows a more complex pattern: as c increases from zero, good 2 is produced more
ine¢ciently but production is being concentrated on the more e¢cient …rm. For high values
of c the latter e¤ect dominates, which explains the increasing part of the function. When
c reaches the region where …rm 2 does not produce but …rm 1 cannot charge the monopoly
price, (cP · c<c M), additional increases of c have the only e¤ect of increasing prices, and
no e¢ciency e¤ect is involved, which explains that the function decreases. Finally, for drastic
innovations (c ¸ cM), the welfare function is constant in c.
16The reason why we obtain a unique cut-o¤ value except for the interval 0:69 <°· 0:71
is not that the shape of the statu quo welfare function changes with parameter °; but only
that it shifts up as ° increases. When ° is low, two points are to be considered: …rst, that a
merger is always superior to the statu quo in the regions where …rm 2 in not active (that is,
the peak in Figure 1 is below the merger welfare function) and, second, that in c =0 ,t h e
statu quo is welfare superior to a merger. Both points jointly imply that only one cut-o¤
value does exist. On the other hand, when ° is high, …rst, mergers are never socially desirable
in the region where both …rms are active and, second, in c = cM a merger is superior to the
statu quo. Again, both points jointly imply that only one cut-o¤ value exists (see Figure 1).
Next proposition combines Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 to derive the optimal merger policy
for the Bertrand case.
Proposition 3.8. Under Bertrand competition, if ° · 0:61, mergers should never be al-
lowed; if 0:61 · ° · 0:69, mergers should be allowed if and only if c ¸ cL0;i f0:69 <°· 0:71,
if either cL0 · c · cn or c ¸ cms
00
; …nally, if °>0:71, if and only if c ¸ cms00.
The above proposition shows …rst, that in the region where both …rms are active (c<c P),
mergers should be allowed only for intermediate values of the di¤erentiation parameter (low
values of ° makes …xed fee licensing always pro…table and high values prevent mergers from
being socially desirable) and either for large enough innovations (for 0:61 · ° · 0:69,s m a l l
innovations prevent mergers from being socially desirable) or for intermediate innovations (for
0:69 <°· 0:71 small and large innovations prevent mergers from being socially desirable).
Second, in the region where in absence of licensing …rm 2 would not be active (c ¸ cP), a new
case appears where above a certain threshold value of c, mergers should again be allowed
(notice that in this region, welfare under the statu quo is always decreasing in c because,
now, …rm 2 is not active and additional increases of c do not transfer any ine¢cient output
to the more e¢cient …rm).
Observe that under Bertrand competition, contrary to what happens under Cournot,
the optimal merger policy does not necessarily lead to technology transfer. For example, in
…gure1, for innovations lying in the interval (cn, cms
00
), licensing by a …xed fee is not pro…table
17for the patentee and, at the same time, a merger is not welfare improving, which implies that
it should be forbidden. In that interval, the superior technology is not transferred under the
optimal merger policy.
Summarizing, from the optimal merger policy derived in Propositions 3.1, 3.2, 3.5 and
3.8, an interesting policy implication can be derived. When licensing is an alternative to
a merger for transferring technology, a more restrictive optimal merger policy is called for.
This argument seems to be present in the 1997 HMG, that prescribes to forbid mergers
whenever the e¢ciency gains can be alternatively achieved through licensing. The optimal
merger policy derived in the paper exactly …ts that prescription only when both …xed fees and
royalties are feasible instruments to license the superior technology. Otherwise, the possibility
of licensing cannot be used as a de…nitive argument against mergers. In particular, it may be
too restrictive because it may lead to forbid welfare improving mergers: in scenario 2, it may
occur because the patentee imposes greater royalties that additionally distort the licensee’s
output, reducing welfare. On the other hand, in scenario 3 because, as Propositions 3.3 and
3.6 show, …xed fee licensing is not always pro…table for the patentee and, in those cases, a
merger is the only e¤ective instrument to transfer the superior technology.
184. WELFARE REDUCING LICENSING
So far, we have focused on deriving the optimal merger policy when licensing is an alternative
to a merger to transfer technology. In this section we want to go a bit further by taking into
account a result that is …rst introduced in the licensing literature in Faulí-Oller and Sandonís
(2000a), namely, the possibility that, under Bertrand competition, a licensing contract re-
duces social welfare7. This possibility seems to suggest the convenience of designing not just
the optimal merger policy, but a more general competition policy that may forbid not only
mergers but also licensing contracts whenever they reduce welfare. For example, in scenario
2, we compared a merger and royalty licensing. The optimal merger policy prescribed just
to allow the merger whenever it is welfare superior to licensing. However, using that rule, we
could be approving welfare reducing mergers. On the other hand, whenever welfare under
licensing is higher than under a merger, we should not only forbid mergers but also check
whether or not the licensing contract improves social welfare. If that is not the case, we
should forbid not only mergers but also licensing.
From a formal point of view, in the …rst stage of the game, the antitrust authority should
decide now whether or not to allow for a merger and also for a licensing contract. Observe
that it makes sense to check whether a licensing contract improves social welfare only when (i)
the contract includes a royalty (licensing the innovation by means of a …xed fee is necessarily
welfare improving: it allows the transfer of the technology without reducing competition at
all) and (ii) competition is àl aB e r t r a n d(it is only under Bertrand competition when the
collusive e¤ect of the royalty arises). Therefore, in this section we have to derive the optimal
competition policy only for the case of Bertrand competition and scenarios 1 and 2, where
the licensing contract includes a royalty. For the rest of the cases, the optimal competition
policy would be just the optimal merger policy derived in the last section.
Next proposition establishes the conditions under which two-part tari¤ licensing reduce
social welfare and derives the optimal competition policy for scenario 1 under Bertrand
competition.
7The result that a licensing contract can reduce social welfare has also been obtained by Erutku and
Richelle (2000) in a context of non-linear contracts and Cournot competition.
19Proposition 4.1. Under Bertrand competition, for close enough substitute goods (°>
0:72), two threshold values of the size of the innovation (c) always exist such that for innova-
tions lying within that interval, licensing reduces social welfare. Thus, within that interval
we should forbid not only mergers but also licensing.
The intuition for the result is the following: …rst, as the goods become closer substitutes
licensing becomes more anticompetitive because the optimal royalty increases. Second, for
low values of c, the royalty is constrained to be small and therefore, licensing does not a¤ect
competition a lot. As the innovation becomes larger, however, the patentee charges a greater
royalty that makes licensing more anticompetitive. Both points together explain that for low
values of c and ° licensing is welfare improving. Third, for drastic innovations, in the absence
of licensing we would have a monopoly in market 1 while, under licensing, we would have
a duopoly (see Proposition 3.2). For drastic innovations then (and by continuity, for near
drastic innovations as well), licensing must be welfare superior to the statu quo. The three
points together explain the result in the above proposition. As a conclusion, the antitrust
agency should take into account not only the anticompetitive e¤ect of a merger but also
the possibility that a licensing contract reduces social welfare. In those cases, the optimal
policy prescription should be to forbid not only mergers (given that two-part tari¤ licensing
is always welfare superior to a merger) but also licensing.8
The same analysis may be done for scenario 2, where only a royalty can be included in the
licensing contract. As before, under Bertrand competition, for close enough substitutes, we
…nd an interval where royalty licensing reduces social welfare. Next proposition formalizes
the result.
Proposition 4.2. Under Bertrand competition, for close enough substitute goods (°>
8Of course, we would like to o¤er a more simple rule regarding when to forbid welfare reducing licensing
contracts. For example, we could just forbid the use of royalties in licensing contracts. With that rule,
the antitrust agency would completely eliminate the possibility that a licensing contract hurts social welfare
because, as we know, …xed fee licensing is always welfare improving. That policy would be optimal, however,
only in a second-best sense because, as we already know (see scenario 3), for close enough substitute goods
and large enough innovations, …xed fee licensing becomes unpro…table for the patentee. It can be easily seen
that, if royalties are forbidden, some welfare improving licensing agreements would not take place.
200:60), two threshold values for the size of the innovation (c) always exist such that for
innovations lying within that interval, licensing by means of a royalty reduces social welfare.
Observe that licensing by means of a royalty reduces social welfare even for more di¤er-
entiated goods (° ¸ 0:60) than two-part tari¤ licensing does (° ¸ 0:72). The reason is that,
in the former case, the optimal royalty is greater, leading the licensing contract to be even
more anticompetitive.
Next proposition compares social welfare under a merger, royalty licensing and the statu
quo in order to derive the optimal competition policy for scenario 2.
Proposition 4.3. Under Bertrand competition:
(i) if °<0:69, a threshold value cml0 always exist such that mergers should be allowed if
and only if c ¸ cml0. In this interval, a licensing contract is always welfare improving.
(ii) if ° ¸ 0:69, two threshold values of c always exist such that for small enough inno-
vations (those lying to the left of the interval formed by those values) licensing is welfare
superior to both a merger and the statu quo and thus, only mergers should be forbidden; for
innovations lying within that interval, either a merger is welfare superior to both licensing
and the statu quo and then no restriction should be imposed, or the statu quo is welfare
superior to licensing and also to a merger and then both mergers and royalty licensing should
be forbidden; …nally, for large enough innovations (to the right of that interval), a merger
domains and then no restriction should be imposed by the antitrust agency.
For di¤erentiated enough goods (°<0:69), competition is not intense and in the region
where licensing is welfare superior to a merger it is also welfare superior to the statu quo
and, similarly, in the region where a merger is welfare superior to licensing it is also welfare
superior to the statu quo, and it should then be allowed. For close enough substitutes
(° ¸ 0:69), however, di¤erent possibilities arise. On the one hand, in the region where
licensing is welfare superior to a merger, for large enough innovations, the statu quo may
become welfare superior to licensing, and hence, in that region not only mergers but also
licensing should be forbidden. On the other hand, in the region where a merger is welfare
21superior to licensing, for intermediate sizes of the innovation, the statu quo becomes welfare
superior to a merger, and thus both mergers and licensing should be forbidden.(see …gure 2)
Figure 2 plots, for ° =0 :70, welfare under a merger (Wm), the statu quo (Wsq) and
the optimal licensing contract (Wl) as a function of c. As we can see in the …gure, for small
innovations (c<c ml0), royalty licensing is welfare superior to both, a merger and the statu
quo, for innovations within the interval (cml0;c n), a merger is the socially preferred regime,
for innovations within the interval (cn;c ms00) the statu quo becomes the socially preferred
option and, …nally, for large innovations (c>c ms00), a merger becomes again welfare superior
to the other two regimes.
225. CONCLUSIONS
The traditional merger policy analysis prescribes to allow a merger if and only if it generates
e¢ciency gains that compensate for their negative impact on competition. In this paper,
we extend this analysis by considering also the existence of an alternative mechanism that
may allow …rms to attain those e¢ciencies, namely, patent licensing. In that case, a more
restrictive merger policy is called for. The 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines was re-
vised in 1997 to incorporate this idea, and it prescribes to forbid mergers whenever e¢ciency
gains are not merger speci…c, but can also be achieved through licensing. In this work,
we have shown that the prescription of the 1997 HMG is too restrictive. In particular, for
large innovations mergers tend to be superior to licensing: when royalties are not feasible,
it is true because large innovations make licensing unpro…table and, at the same time, make
mergers socially desirable; on the other hand, when …xed fees are not feasible, because for
large innovations the patentee tends to impose high royalties that distort total output and
welfare.
Without considering the possibility of licensing, the traditional merger policy is more
restrictive the closer substitutes the goods are, because a merger becomes more anticompet-
itive. This is still true in our framework whenever royalties are feasible. When only fees
are feasible, however, the result is reversed: mergers should be allowed only when the goods
are good substitutes. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that what determines the
merger policy in that case is whether licensing is pro…table or not, and it turns out that it
is not pro…table when the goods are close substitutes.
Our analysis is useful to design not only the optimal merger policy but a more general
competition policy, in the sense that it also allows us to prescribe whether licensing should
be allowed or not. As we have shown, while under Cournot competition licensing is always
welfare improving, under Bertrand competition the royalty works as a collusive device that
allows the patentee to increase prices, producing a negative e¤ect on social welfare. As a
consequence, for large enough, non-drastic innovations, licensing may reduce social welfare
and, thus, it should be forbidden by the antitrust authorities.
Another interesting question arising from our results is whether the design of the optimal
23competition policy always favors technology transfer. The answer is negative. On the one
hand, under Bertrand competition, cases exist where not only mergers but also licensing
agreements are forbidden under the optimal competition policy, preventing the …rms from
transferring the superior technology. On the other hand, a special case exist where mergers
are forbidden even though they are the only e¤ective instrument to transfer the superior
technology: when we consider …xed fee contracts, for large enough innovations and close
enough substitutes, licensing becomes unpro…table for the patentee and, given that compe-
tition is intense, a merger is not welfare improving and it should then be forbidden. In those
cases, the optimal competition policy also prevents the difusion of the patented innovation.
In this paper, we have assumed that a patented process innovation already exist and
analyze the incentives of the patentee to transfer the innovation through a licensing contract
and also through a merger, and then compare their e¤ect on social welfare in order to
design the optimal competition policy. An interesting extension of the paper would be to
go one step backwards and consider also a previous stage in which the …rms decide their
R&D investments, and then analyze how the incentives of the …rms to undertake R&D
are a¤ected by di¤erent antitrust policies. In that case, in order to design the optimal
competition policy we should compare the anticompetitive e¤ect of a merger with the both
the eventual e¢ciency gains and the increase in the incentives of the …rms to undertake
R&D. As a result and compared with our setting, we could prescribe in that case a less
severe merger policy.
246. APPENDIX
The third stage Nash equilibrium
For the case of Cournot competition, the third stage …rms’ Nash equilibrium outputs,
prices, pro…ts and total incomes when …rm 2 has accepted a (f;r)c o n t r a c tw i t hr · c,a r e
given by:
x1(r)=m i n f
2 ¡ °(1 ¡ r)
4 ¡ °2 ; 1
2g; x2(r)=m a x f
2(1 ¡ r) ¡ °
4 ¡ °2 ; 0g;
¼1(r)=x1(r)2; ¼2(r)=x2(r)2;
¦1(r;f)=¼1(r)+rx2(r)+f;¦ 2(r;f)=¼2(r) ¡ f:
By substituting c for r in the above expressions, the equilibrium outputs and pro…ts
under the statu quo situation are obtained. Notice that when …rm 2 is not active, …rm one
produces the monopoly output x1 =1 =2:













For the case of Bertrand competition, let us …rst analyze the case of non-drastic innova-
tions (c<c M). The third stage Nash equilibrium prices, outputs and pro…ts, when …rm 2
has accepted a (f;r) contract with r · c,a r eg i v e nb y 9:
p1(r)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2)+3 °r
4 ¡ °2 ; p2(r)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2)+( 2+°2)r
4 ¡ °2 ;
x1(r)=
(2 + °) ¡ °r(1 + °)
(1 + °)(4 ¡ °2)
; x2(r)=
(2 + °) ¡ 2r(1 + °)
(1 + °)(4 ¡ °2)
;
¼1(r)=p1(r) x1(r);¼2(r)=( p2(r) ¡ r) x2(r):
On the other hand, if r>c , the new technology would not be used and the statu quo
would prevail, which for c<c P,w h e r ecP =
(2¡°¡°2)
2¡°2 , leads to the following equilibrium
prices, outputs and pro…ts:
9In order to check that the interior equilibrium is e¤ectively an equilibrium we have to check that no …rm
has an incentive to deviate by lowering its price in order to expel the competitor from the market. This




2(8+8°+°2+°3) .A s rM >c M; the expressions below
e¤ectively represents the equilibrium for the non-drastic case.
25P1(c)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2)+°c2
4 ¡ °2 ; P2(c)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2)+2 c2
4 ¡ °2 ;
X1(c)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2)+°c2
4 ¡ 5°2 + °4 ; X2(c)=
(2 ¡ ° ¡ °2) ¡ c2(2 ¡ °2)
4 ¡ 5°2 + °4 ;
¦1(c)=P1(c) X1(c); ¦2(c)=( P2(c) ¡ c) X2(c):
In that region, both …rms are active.









In that region, …rm 2 is not active but …rm 1 cannot charge the monopoly price.
Let us next analyze the third stage equilibrium for the case of drastic innovations (c ¸
cM) when …rm 2 has accepted a (f;r) contract with r · c.I f cM · r<r M,w h e r et h e
value of rM is given in the previous footnote, both an interior and a monopoly equilibrium
exist; the interior one is given by the above expressions and at the monopoly equilibrium,
x1 = p1 =1 =2 and ¼1 =1 =4. On the other hand, if r ¸ rM, the monopoly equilibrium
arises.10 Finally, for r>c , the statu quo would prevail, with …rm 1 becoming a monopolist
and again x1 = p1 =1 =2 and ¼1 =1 =4.
Solving this program directly results in the optimal two-part tari¤ contracts shown in
the paper for both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1
Let us denote by Wm and W r social welfare under a merger and under a licensing contract





2(¡4¡4°+3°2+3°3) .A scml ¸ r0
c; licensing is always socially preferred to
am e r g e r .







2(4+4°+5°2+5°3) : As cml0
¸ r0
B; licensing is always so-
cially preferred to a merger.
10In fact, the case r>c M, is not relevant for the analysis, as the optimal royalty is never greater than cM.
26P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 2
With Cournot, cml · r00
c and therefore for c>c ml a merger is socially preferred to
licensing.
With Bertrand, cml0 · r00
B and therefore for c>c ml0 a merger is socially preferred to
licensing.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 3
For Cournot competition, directly comparing industry pro…ts under …xed fee licensing
with the statu quo situation, we obtain that ¼1(0) + ¼2(0) <¼ 1(c)+¼2(c) if and only if
°>0:82 and c>c L,w h e r ecL =
2(4 ¡ 4° + °2)
4+°2 :
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 4
For Cournot competition, comparing welfare under both a merger and the statu quo





P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 5
Whenever licensing is not privately pro…table and mergers are socially preferred to the
statu quo, mergers should be allowed. This proposition just brings together the correspond-
ing conditions from propositions 3.3 and 3.4, taking into account that cL ¸ cms.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 6
We have to compare industry pro…ts under …xed fee licensing with the statu quo situation
in the two relevant cases.
If c · cP, ¼1(0) + ¼2(0) < ¦1(c)+¦ 2(c) if °>0:65 and c>c L0.





4+2°¡2°2 and cL0 =
2(¡2+°+°2)2
4¡3°2¡°4 .T h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e
proposition directly follows the previous inequalities.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 7
We shall proceed to compare welfare under a merger and under the statu quo in the two
relevant regions.
If c · cP, Wm ¸ Wsq if ° · 0:69 and c ¸ cms0,a n di f0:69 <°· 0:71 and














2(1+°) and W sq denotes welfare under the statu quo. The statement in the
proposition directly follows the previous inequalities.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 8
We have that for ° · 0:61 licensing is always pro…table for the patentee and mergers
should not be allowed. For 0:61 · ° · 0:65,w eh a v ecL00 >c ms0;which implies that mergers
should be allowed in this region for c ¸ cL00
: For 0:65 · ° · 0:69,w eh a v ecL0
>c ms0,w h i c h
implies that mergers should be allowed in this region for c ¸ cL0.F o r 0:69 <°<0:710,
we have cms0 <c L0 <c n and cms00 >c n; which implies that mergers should be allowed in
this region if either cL0
· c · cn or c ¸ cms00.F o r 0:710 <°<0:7112,w eh a v et h a t
cn <c L0 <c ms00, which implies that mergers should be allowed in this region for c ¸ cms00.
Finally, for °>0:7112, cn and cms0 does not exist and cL0
<c ms00, which implies that mergers
should be allowed in this region for c ¸ cms00.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 1
The result follows from comparing social welfare under licensing and under the statu
quo. For ° · 0:72, the latter is never superior. For 0:72 <°<0:94, the statu quo is
superior if and only if cl1 <c<c l2: Finally, if ° ¸ 0:94 if and only if cl3 <c<c l2;
where cl1 =
2(8¡8°¡2°2+4°3¡°4¡°5)









2(4+4°+5°2+5°3) : This proof joint with Proposition 3.1
implies that inside the interval, not only mergers but also licensing should be forbidden.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 2
The result follows from comparing welfare under licensing and under the statu quo.
For ° · 0:60, the latter is never superior. If 0:60 <°<0:94, the statu quo is superior
if and only if cl1 <c<c l4.F i n a l l y , i f ° ¸ 0:94 if and only if cl5 <c<c l4,w h e r e
cl1 =
2(8¡8°¡2°2+4°3¡°4¡°5)









2(64+64°+16°2+16°3+°4+°5) . This proof joint with
Proposition 3.1 implies that within that interval, we should forbid not only mergers but also
licensing.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 3
28By using the results derived in propositions 3.2, 3.7 and 4.2 and given that cl1 <c n and
cms0 <c l4 a l lw eh a v et od oi sc o m p a r i n gcml0, cl1 and cms0. In particular, if °<0:60, licensing
is always welfare superior to the statu quo (cl1does not exist), the statu quo welfare function
crosses only once the merger welfare function (cn and cms00 do not exist) and cms0 <c ml0;i f
0:60 <°<0:69, cms0
<c ml0
<c l1 and cn and cms00 does not exist.
If 0:69 <°<0:7111, cms0 <c ml0 <c l1 and the statu quo welfare function crosses three
times the merger welfare function (cn and cms00 come into play). This implies that for c<c ml0
licensing dominates; for cml0 · c<c n, a merger dominates; for cn · c<c ms00; statu quo
dominates and for cms00 · c; a merger again dominates.
If 0:7111 <°<0:7112;c l1 <c ml0
<c ms0
; which implies that for c<c l1, licensing
dominates; for cl1 · c<c ms0 statu quo dominates; for cms0 · c<c n a merger dominates;
for cn · c<c ms00 statu quo dominates and for cms00
· c a merger again dominates.
If °>0:7112, cms0and cn do not exist any longer. For 0:7112 <°<0:94, cl1 <c ml0 <
cms00, which implies that for c<c l1, licensing dominates; for cl1 · c<c ms00
; statu quo
dominates and for cms00
· c a merger dominates. For °>0:94, cl5 <c ml0
<c ms00,w h i c h
implies that for c<c l5, licensing dominates; for cl5 · c<c ms00, statu quo dominates and for
cms00
· c; a merger dominates.
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